Cyber attacks endanger physical, economic, social, and political security. We use a Bayesian state space model to forecast the number of future cyber attacks. Cyber attacks were defined as malware detected by cyber analysts over seven years using cyber events (i.e., reports of malware attacks supported by evidence) at a large Computer Security Service Provider (CSSP). This CSSP protects a variety of computers and networks, which are critical infrastructure, for the U.S. Department of Defense and affiliated organizations. We find that cyber events from the previous week predict the number of events one week ahead. Unlike past work on predicting cyber attacks, our dataset was from an operational CSSP and based on analyst detection rather than logs or automated systems. Our finding of non-randomness in attacks is consistent with previous work reporting systematicity in attacks detected from logs and automated systems. Advanced information provided by a forecast may help with threat awareness for future cyber events similar to a weather forecast. Potential applications for cyber event forecasting include proactive allocation of resources and capabilities for cyber defense (e.g., analyst staffing and sensor configuration) in CSSPs. Consequently, enhanced threat awareness may improve cyber security by helping to optimize human and technical capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive nature of cyber systems ensures far-reaching consequences of cyber attacks. Cyber attacks threaten physical, economic, social, and political security. Types of malware include viruses (e.g., Melissa), worms (e.g., Code Red, Nimbda, ILOVEYOU), adware (e.g., ShopAtHome), spyware (e.g., key loggers), and ransomware (e.g., CyrptoLocker). The effects of malware on connected systems can disrupt, deny, and even disable the operation of critical infrastructure including power grids, communication networks, hospitals, financial institutions, and defense and military systems. To protect its critical infrastructure, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has identified cyberspace (information networks for computers, communication, and other systems) as a key operational environment for the military [1] . The DoD defines cyberspace as an information environment that is interdependent with the physical environment (air, land, maritime, and space) [1] . A key component of the DoD's strategy and implementation plans for protecting cyberspace is enhancing threat awareness for Computer Security Service Providers [CSSPs] [2, 24] ; note that CSSPs may also be referred to as Computer Defense Service Providers, Computer Network Defense Service Providers, Computer Security Service Providers, and Cybersecurity Defense.
Analysts in CSSPs protect DoD and DoD affiliated computers and networks by finding, analyzing, and documenting attacks. To enhance threat awareness, we use time-series forecasting to predict the weekly frequencies of malware detection by analysts in a large CSSP over a sevenyear period of time. We operationalize analyst detection of malware using the number of analyst reports of malware based on evidence of a computer security incident, referred to as cyber events. Analyst detection of cyber events are novel because prior forecasting in cybersecurity has quantified attacks using data from logs (e.g., network traffic) and rule-based automated defenses. While automated systems (e.g., anti-virus software, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and intrusion protection systems) provide layers of defense, they can also generate false alerts and may miss malware [4] .
Related research on cybersecurity forecasting classifies attacks using automated tools and logs. This work has consistently shown both that attack frequency over time is nonrandom and that attacks tend to disproportionately exploit specific vulnerabilities. However, data using automated classification of attacks may lack the insight and filtering effects of human analysis.
More generally, time-series forecasting has been used to predict patterns in natural phenomena (e.g., economics, finance, and climate and weather) [5] . Additionally, predictive models have also been applied to temporal and spatial prediction of crime [6] and insurgent/terrorist activities [7] .
Here, we apply forecasting to CSSP analyst detection of cyber events using a Bayesian State Space Model (BSSM) to predict the number of future events and an interval for the range of uncertainty. We show cyber events are predictable one week ahead. Similar to a weather forecast, our cyber event forecast is a probabilistic model for likely future outcomes. Our forecast may enhance threat awareness for CSSPs. Forecasting of cyber events may be used for establishing proactive policies and also improve the allocation of resources for prevention and analysis. Thus, accurate prediction may substantially reduce the human cost by optimizing the utilization of analyst time without affecting existing risk management schemes.
II. RELATED WORK
Prior research on cyber attacks has demonstrated that attacks are predictable and exhibit bursts. We briefly review the forecasting research on cyber attacks based on logs and automated systems. Accurate prediction of attacks is a notoriously hard problem due to the presence of extreme values, characterized by bursts of cyber attacks. In addition, we summarize further evidence for attack systematicity: Cyber attacks tend to disproportionately exploit a relatively small set of vulnerabilities.
A. Forecasting
The number of cyber attacks over time, using logged data at minute and hour intervals, are predictable over up to a day [8] [9] [10] . This line of research identified bursts of attacks (extreme increases in attack frequency) [8] [9] as well as the presence of a long-range dependency (a slow decay in the frequency of attacks over time) [10] . Modeling extremes and the long-range dependency improved attack forecasting. In the previously described research, cyber attack data consisted of deep packet inspection (i.e., the data contained in the packet) [8] and a honeypot (i.e., a method for deceiving attackers, through deflection and deception, while potentially learning about attacker tactics and techniques) [9] [10] . Further evidence for using extremes in attack predictability is the number of IP addresses for the majority of attacks are attributed to a small number of attackers [11] .
Taken together, these findings provide compelling evidence of extremes in cyber attacks. We suggest extremes are a strong indicator of human involvement in cyber attacks because bursty patterns are a universal phenomenon in human behavior, including diverse activities such as communication and work tasks [12] . The data generating process for bursts is non-Poisson because the rate and variance are unequal [12] . A longrange dependency also implies non-Poisson process.
Nevertheless, bursts in cyber attacks are not always found. Other cyberattack forecasting research did not report bursts of attacks but had a time scale of months from 1989 to 1995 with an unspecified detection method [13] . Similarly, bursts were not reported for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, but the data were limited to one-minute intervals over less than an hour [14] . Consequently, the absence of bursts may be due to aggregation and/or insufficient data.
B. Vulnerabilities
Non-random exploitation of vulnerabilities provides converging evidence for systematicity in cyber attacks. A small number of vulnerabilities tend to be disproportionately exploited. For example, data breaches can be classified with 90% accuracy using two types of externally observable risks: a) Misconfigured internal systems (e.g., not changing the default username and password) and b) Anomalous outbound traffic (e.g., spam, port scanning) [15] . Another approach used internal network monitoring logs to identify the probabilities of malware using specific vulnerable vectors (e.g., network configuration, unpatched software, and particular services) [16] .
III. CYBER EVENT DATASET
The malware cyber event dataset here is comprised of thousands of reports over seven years obtained from a large DoD CSSP. Note that not all CSSPs perform the same activities. For example, few perform penetration testing but nearly all handle security incident reporting [17] . The current dataset is from a CSSP that is responsible for computer and network defense of multiple DoD agencies and organizations working with the DoD (e.g., industry). This specific CSSP rarely uses (<1%) automated systems for detecting potential threats. The generic tasks and workflow for cyber analysts in DoD CSSPs are described in [17] , and also see [18] .
Because the data were from an operational CSSP, we are unable to provide specific details such as the following:
1. Actual years for the cyber events (event data are from after the year 2000) 2. Bins smaller than one week (e.g., events per day) 3. Specific report contents (e.g., method[s] of detection, evidence for the cyber event [also called testimony], and the type of malware) 4. Names of the CSSP customers/clients and the number of clients Therefore, only the frequency of cyber events per week and the average report length per week were analyzed. Report length was used as a rough proxy for the amount of evidence or testimony for events. The raw cyber event report data was binned into the number of reports generated per week. This interval size permitted public release of the data and results, a large number of data points (t = 366 weeks), and considerable variability while also minimizing the number of empty intervals with no cyber events. Use of the data in research was approved by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory's Institutional Review Board.
A. Example CSSP Cyber Event Report
To provide more background and context for analyst detection, we define cyber event, describe how an event is detected, and show a hypothetical event report. A cyber event documents a computer security event and can be shared among other network security operations. A computer-security incident is the violation of security, acceptable use, or standard security practices [4] . Although there are specific content requirements for the filing of an incident within the U.S. Federal Government, report content for the CSSP included the date of analyst detection and a paragraph-long 'testimony section' describing evidence for the cyber event. Other information includes the location or site/customer involved and IP addresses for the target and source of the attack. 
IV. FORECASTING CYBER EVENTS
The best fit forecast model predicted the number of cyber events for a given week using the number from a previous week. Fig 2 indicates that the counts of cyber events per week were non-normal and zero-inflated suggesting evidence of bursts. Results are partially reproducible, the data on counts of weekly cyber events and code for reproducing the figures and models are available here: https://osf.io/hjffm/. Unfortunately, for reasons previously mentioned, we are unable to provide the raw data and code for data cleaning.
The CSSP's total number of cyber events per year was linearly associated with its number of unique customers per year. OLS regression yielded a strong positive slope, F(1, 6) = 17.32, p < 0.006, Multiple R 2 = 0.70. In other words, there was a clear linear relationship between the increase in cyber events and the growth in customers over the seven years.
A. Dataset Characteristics and Baseline Modeling
Approaches Several characteristics of this time series are immediately obvious from visual inspection (see the magenta line in Fig 3) . First, the number of reports generated per week increases over time. Second, there appears to be a substantial shift in the time series in the early part of Year 2, where both the mean and variability increase (a structural break in the time series). Both trending and structural breaks represent a violation of stationarity. Stationarity is a requirement for most time-series models.
Regression analysis confirmed existence of a linear trend with time, as well as a structural break at time point t = 83 (we tested for, but did not find evidence of seasonality, another example of non-stationarity). Using the residuals from this regression produces a detrended, stationary time series with mean of zero. We used this detrended time series in subsequent analyses.
After detrending, we tested for the presence of serial correlation in the data. Inspection of the autocorrelation function (ACF) indicated the presence of strong positive serial correlation. The numbers of cyber event reports in one week tend to be followed by similar numbers the next week.
We used a number of widely used performance measures for evaluating forecast accuracy. The most direct measure of forecast accuracy is the forecast error that is computed as the difference between predicted and observed values. The mean absolute error (MAE) is calculated as the average of the absolute values of forecast errors. The mean squared error (MSE) is calculated as the average of the squared forecast errors. This ABD appears to be participating in bot net activity. The ping is keeping the session alive and ABC is waiting for further botnet instruction.
Action Taken: Notified XYZ Report Submitted, Analyst: 4321 For example, there were 0-10 cyber events in nearly 100 of the 366 measure often penalizes large errors. The root mean squared error, or RMSE, is computed as the square root of MSE. Additionally, in the context of our application, predictive accuracy is critical: Observed values appropriately being captured by estimates of interval uncertainty in the forecast models.
For the cyber event prediction problem, we evaluated a number of standard forecasting techniques. However, due to the inherent complexity of the cyber event data, many of them provided poor results. The simplest approach is the moving average (MA) that has a single parameter k. The forecast of the model is simply the average of the last k observed values. The weighted moving average method (WMA) assigns different weights to the last k values, with recent values often getting higher weights. The simple exponential smoothing (ES) method predicts the next value as a weighted average of last observed value and the last predicted value with the weights often chosen to minimize the forecast error. The Holt-Winter method (H-W) extends ES to also include seasonality by combining forecasting with three smoothing equations for level, trend and seasonality respectively. However, we observed that none of these techniques provided appropriate accuracy.
Using ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) models can account for many forms of serial correlation and generate forecasts of future values. The "integrated" or "I" part of ARIMA controls for unit root processes (another type of nonstationarity) by differencing the data. We found no evidence that our time series was a unit root process, and so we restricted our model selection to ARMA models.
Using both the Box-Jenkins approach involving inspection of the ACF and partial ACF [2] , as well as automated ARMA selection tools [13] , we converged upon an ARMA model of order (1, 1) . Testing the residuals from this model indicate that it accounts for all the serial correlation in the data, although the residuals do exhibit evidence of non-normality (a common feature of count data).
While ARIMA models provided acceptable overall accuracy, they underestimated spikes in events and the lower bound of the confidence intervals was less than zero. Given the stringent requirements in an operational CSSP, we sought a more accurate forecast using a state space model that captured the distribution of the data. Although ARIMA models can be written as state space models, rather than using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the opposite does not necessarily hold.
State space models have become increasingly popular for forecasting problems because of increased computing power and a family of well-developed Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms [19] . At a high level, this approach decomposes the underlying generative process into two types of variables: (a) Observation variables and (b) State variables. The model then defines a state transition equation that controls how the process moves between states and an observation equation that generates a noisy output based on the current state.
B. Bayesian State Space Model (BSSM)
We used a BSSM because the data were non-normal and bounded by zero. The BSSM had better predictive accuracy than the baseline models. A BSSM has several clear advantages over traditional approaches to time-series forecasting using OLS regression: First, it can estimate of multiple sources of variability (e.g., measurement error) [20] rather than only random model variance [21] . Second, it does not require modeling structural breaks (changes in the forecast at specific time points) and detrending data. Third, it can accommodate data with non-stationarity (i.e., changes in mean, variance, and correlation structure over time).
Forecasting was performed using a BSSM with a negative binomial distribution. BSSM is a transparent machine-learning technique that decomposes the data into observations and the model into simultaneously estimated states [20] (see Equations 1, 2, and 3). The BSSM was implemented in the statistical programming language R using the brms package [22] as a wrapper for R Stan [23] . Default Bayesian priors were used for estimation. Equations 1 is the overall forecast model for observations and Equations 2 and 3 are the two states.
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Model variables are defined in Table 1 . No seasonal and/or cyclical patterns were visually apparent in the data, nor where they significant predictors in the ARIMA models, thus these parameters were omitted from the model. Including report length (of a cyber event) as a parameter in the model yielded a worse-fitting model based on the Widely applicable Bayesian Information Criterion (WBIC) [24] : The model with report length had WBIC = 2590.98 versus the model omitting report length WBIC = 2586.43. Lower WBIC values indicates a better relative model fit.
Figs. 3 (weeks for
Year 3) and 4 (all 366 weeks) show the one-week ahead BSSM forecast. Note the forecast (white line) in relation to the observed number of events (magenta line). Despite deviations in the forecast with bursts, nearly all cyber events were captured by the credible interval (gray-scale shading).
The credible interval (the Bayesian equivalent of a frequentist confidence interval) estimates the probability the true value of the data are captured as a random variable. Formally, the credible interval is defined as the predictive or posterior probability distribution of the model parameters given the observed data [25] .
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
By forecasting analyst detected analyst detected cyber events, we have shown systematicity in malware over time. The frequency of attacks from the previous week predict the number for the next week. The finding of non-random attacks is consistent with prior research on forecasting using data from log and automated systems. In contrast to earlier work, we used cyber events from analysts in an operational CSSP protecting critical infrastructure. Like a weather forecast, cyber event forecasting may proactively enhance threat awareness. This may enable CSSPs and similar organizations to better plan for and manage attacks against their defended domains. Moving from reactive and passive defenses to more proactive defenses may help optimize cybersecurity for both analysts and technical systems.
A. Potential Applications
Advance knowledge about the probable range of attack frequency may aid threat awareness in cybersecurity. Potential applications for CSSPs are using the forecast to proactively BSSM forecast for all 366 weeks. The forecast trend is the white line and the observed number of events is the magenta line. For the model given the data, the 95% credible intervals depict uncertainty using gray scale shading. Gradients from dark to light indicate growing uncertainty in estimating the true number of cyber events, but a higher probability that the interval captures the true value.
inform allocation of capabilities such as the sensors and their configuration (e.g., sampling rate, sensor sites) and type of monitoring (e.g., network traffic). Additionally, a cyber event forecast could help guide resources such as analyst staffing levels.
However, we caution that forecasts should not be used as a target or a quota for analysts or CSSPs. When a measure becomes a goal, that measure may no longer be meaningful as an outcome [e.g., 2; referred to as Campbell's Law or Goodheart's Law]. The meaning of a measure can be distorted by biases such as social and political pressure which may introduce incentives with unintended consequences.
B. Limitations
Because the dataset was from an operational CSSP, we were limited to weekly bins and could not include contents of cyber events. While we were unable to do so, incorporating internal and external variables may improve the quality of the forecast and also aid in identifying associated factors.
Specifically, report length aggregated by week was not an informative predictor. Extracting and categorizing the testimony in each report may yield more-informative predictors about cyber events, but the sensitive nature of the raw data may preclude such future research from being published in the open scientific literature. Last, we treat each cyber event as equivalent. That is, we do not account for differences in impact among attacks (e.g., consequential effects on security and economic measures [loss of productivity and time]).
Even with over seven years of weekly data, other research on forecasting cyberattacks that uses logs and automated defenses contains several magnitudes of order more data (e.g., [8] [9] ). This is because attacks captured using these methods have a vastly higher frequency and smaller time intervals (minutes and hours) over day(s). Consequently, moresophisticated models can be fit to such attack data. We find qualitative evidence of bursts in the current data, it is heavytailed which is consistent with most prior cybersecurity research on attacks. However, we find no evidence of long range dependency in the current work. This may be because the data are binned in weekly intervals and/or, perhaps, because analyst detected cyber events have different properties than ones detected by automated systems.
Although we can predict malware frequency, we lack direct empirical evidence to explain causes for attack systematicity. Causal inference is a general challenge with observational data [27] . Nevertheless, prediction without identifying causes does not necessarily change the accuracy of prediction. Prediction accuracy will be maintained as long as the conditions and underlying assumptions remain constant.
However, a forecast may become unreliable if conditions change, so models should be frequently recalibrated and validated and they should preferably use multiple sources of data. This is illustrated by the initial accuracy and then inaccuracy of Google Flu Trends (GFT) [28] . GTF relied on a single source of data (Google search terms related to the flu) and did not update assumptions (e.g., the introduction of suggestions for search terms and other changes to Google search) [28] .
C. Factors for Attacks?
While we have not identified specific associated or causal factors here, past research suggests there are multiple causes for cyber attacks. Potential factors are not mutually exclusive. First, there may be planned timing in related attacks (a series of cyber attacks over time) by the same individual, group, or coordination among groups [29] . In the current work, a series of planned attacks, if they exist, are mixed by aggregation and the absence of detailed information about each event.
Recovering separate distributions from their mixtures is a difficult problem [30] . Second, it is possible that exploits are created and/or purchased on the dark web and deployed by varying groups around the same time.
Last, activities in social media and events in the physical world likely contribute to attack patterns and vice-versa. Prior research has found associations among cyber attacks on DoD networks and foreign media reports of U.S. military actions [31] . Also, website defacements have been linked to a variety of events in the physical world (e.g., violence, protests, and threats) [32] . Incorporating expert insights from cybersecurity analysts and analysts in the broader intelligence community may provide additional predictors for cyber attacks and as well as their associations with activities in the physical world.
D. Future Directions
Empirically assessing cybersecurity analysts' understanding of the cyber event forecasts could advance potential applications. Research on human understanding of uncertainty in visualization of forecast models is surprisingly limited [33] .
Another direction is combining log and automated defenses and prior knowledge of common vulnerabilities with analyst detection. This could advance understanding how layers of defense are coupled, or not, and how particular attacks pass through layers of defense. Network topology is also relevant to attack forecasting: Using log and network topology, an early warning system for mitigating attacks has been developed by modeling probable attack penetration and victims [34] .
The forecast for analyst detection does not identify specific factors associated with attacks. To enhance awareness about specific threats, it is vital to uncover associated, and ideally causal, factors for cyber attacks. This cannot be done with cyber data alone because it is inter-dependent with the physical environment [1] . In the future, we seek to improve cyber forecasting and to infer the causes for attack patterns. Because of the challenges of openly publishing details with the current dataset, we may use openly available datasets, where attackers sometimes self-identify and even provide the motivation for their attack, such as website defacements (e.g., [32] ). Potential variables include events in the physical world as well as more detailed information about the attacks (e.g., the type of malware, exploits/vulnerabilities used, source[s] of the attack, and malware pricing on the dark web, see [35] ).
Another line of future research is to evaluate alternative loss functions. Most time-series forecasting methods assume the squared loss functions for optimization. However, in the security context, especially for critical infrastructure, investigation of other loss functions is a technical gap. For example, a negative forecast error (i.e., underestimate) could be far more expensive than a positive one (i.e., overestimate). The squared loss function treats both scenarios equivalently. Another line of research is to design forecasting models that can produce richer outputs such as range of forecasts along with the confidence interval or other estimation of uncertainty. Additionally, an interactive forecast model that can output the confidence over a human specified range is often useful from a risk aware resource allocation perspective. Finally, we also plan to evaluate ensembles of forecasting models so that we can combine the advantages of various forecasting models (e.g., ARIMA, state space based, and techniques for modeling complex dependencies in the data such as [34] ) to produce a superior output.
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